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Competition and "cream skimming" 
in Germany: Incentives and opportunities 
In their eply, Winkelhake and John 
raise important issues for the Ger- 
man insurance system and others 
that depend on risk equalization 
schemes (RES) to insure fair com- 
petition and prevent cream skim- 
ming. In essence, they argue that 
German data protection laws 
"make it impossible" to individually 
identify good or bad risks among 
existing enrollees by using utiliza- 
tion data. We agree. They conclude, 
therefore, that there is no need to 
improve the RES. We disagree, 
and argue that a careful considera- 
tion of both the incentives and 
opportunities for cream skimming 
in the German system will show 
that cream skimming is still 
possible and likely unless the RES 
is substantially improved. Further 
continued use of the existing RES 
is likely to mean that sickness funds 
with higher proportions of the ter- 
minally ill, disabled and other high 
risk groups will not be able to com- 
pete effectively with other funds on 
the basis of price (e.g. contribution 
rate). 
-We agree that the very strict 
German data protection laws do 
protect sickness fund members 
from the most blatant forms of 
cream skimming. If high risk indivi- 
duals cannot be personally iden- 
tified by their own sickness funds, 
they cannot be "dumped" or dis- 
enrolled by the fund, or "black 
listed" by other funds. In fact, 
and in sharp contrast to the U.S., 
German insurance law does not 
permit any risk selection, or "medi- 
cal underwriting" based on indi- 
vidual health statistics or other 
characteristics. 
- Yet the law does not prohibit 
other forms of cream skimming 
that are based on identification of 
high and low risk groups. And 
as competition between sickness 
funds increases, the incentives and 
opportunities for cream skimming 
also increase. As indicated in our 
earlier article, research in the U.S. 
and Netherlands shows that while 
the top two percent are responsible 
for about 40 % of all health expen- 
ditures, the bottom 50% are re- 
sponsible for only 3 % 1. In short, 
the skewed distribution of health 
expenditures in modern health 
systems is a very powerful incen- 
tive for risk selection - that is to 
identify and attract low risk groups 
and avoid high risk groups. 
-The  U.S. experience suggests 
that when competition increases, 
insurers quickly learn how to 
promote risk selection by offering 
selected benefits and through 
targeted marketing. U.S. insurers 
have learned, for example, that the 
chronically ill are likely to be more 
concerned about whether an in- 
surance plan offers benefits they 
are likely to need, such as mental 
health or long term care, than they 
are about price. The result is that 
many U.S. firms avoid or minimize 
benefits that are likely to attract 
high risk, high cost enrollees. U.S. 
firms have also learned that bene- 
fits for health promotion and fit- 
ness are likely to attract younger, 
healthier enrollees 2,3. While the 
German situation is substantial- 
ly different because of mandated 
benefits, and restrictions on adver- 
tising, many sickness funds have 
increased their activities in health 
promotion and fitness, and preven- 
tion 4. Only time will tell whether 
sickness funds also develop strate- 
gies to avoid or minimize their 
attraction to higher isk groups. 
-Our  major concern about the 
existing RES is that it will not 
achieve the major objectives itwas 
designed for: to reduce differences 
in fund contribution rates based on 
differences in risk structures, so 
that funds can compete primarily 
on the basis of administrative ef- 
ficiency and service. Winkelhake 
and John's analysis of 1992 Ger- 
man data agrees with previous 
findings from the U. S., the Nether- 
lands, and Switzerland. RES based 
on socio-demographic measures 
consistently explain only a small 
part of total use and expenditures, 
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while measures based on chronic 
illness, disability, previous utiliza- 
tion, diagnosis, and death rates 
explain much more, especially in 
combination 5-7. 
-These  findings mean, in turn, 
that sickness funds that include 
higher proportions of the chroni- 
cally ill, disabled, and other high 
risk groups will not be fully com- 
pensated for the high risk groups 
they actually serve. If they are not, 
their expenditures and contribu- 
tion rates will remain higher, and 
they will be at a continuing price 
disadvantage with substitute funds 
and others that have more favor- 
able risk structures. In short, if 
German citizens choose funds pri- 
marily on the basis of price, high 
risk, high price funds are likely 
to lose a lot of members to funds 
that have lower contribution rates. 
Research in the U.S. also shows 
that price is the single most impor- 
tant factor in the insurance choices 
of low risk individuals 2.If German 
citizens follow this pattern, high 
price funds may increasingly be left 
with even higher proportions of 
high risk groups. 
In conclusion, we express our 
thanks to Winkelhake and John for 
their important contributions on 
these issues, and to the journal for 
the opportunity to respond. We still 
conclude that the RES needs to be 
substantially improved to promote 
competition based on efficiency 
and service, rather than differences 
between funds in risk structures. 
Further, despite the protections of 
the German insurance law, wich 
are important and considerable, we 
believe that increased competition 
under the existing RES will lead 
funds to engage in creative ways to 
avoid high risk and attract low risk 
groups, i.e. to engage in some 
forms of cream skimming. In our 
view, these considerations clearly 
suggest the need for additional 
research, not only on improving 
the RES, but on the consequences 
of the recent changes for risk seg- 
mentation, expenditures, contri- 
bution rates, promotion, disease 
management, marketing, and con- 
solidation. 
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